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Social media teams as digital vanguards: the question of 
leadership in the management of official Facebook and 
Twitter accounts of Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, and 
UK Uncut 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Political campaigning in recent protest movements such as Occupy Wall Street in the US, the 
indignados/15M movement in Spain and UK Uncut has witnessed the rise of social media teams, 
small activist groups responsible for managing official and high-visibility social media accounts. 
Going against dominant assertions about the leaderless character of contemporary digital 
movements, the article conceptualises social media teams as digital vanguards, collective and 
informal leadership structures that perform a “vanguard-function” (Nunes, 2014) of direction of 
collective action through the use of digital media of communication. Various aspects of the 
internal functioning of vanguards are discussed: a) their formation and composition; b) 
processes of internal coordination; c) struggles for the control of social media accounts. The 
article reveals the profound contradiction between the leadership role exercised by social media 
teams and the adherence of digital activists to libertarian values of openness, horizontality and 
leaderlessness. The espousal of these principles has run against the persistence of power 
dynamics, personal ambitions and factionalism leading to deep conflicts within these teams that 
have hastened the decline of the movements they served. These problems call for a new 
conceptual framework to better render the nature of leadership in digital movements and new 
political practices to better regulate the management of social media assets.   
 
Keywords: Social media; leadership; Occupy Wall Street; media teams; power; horizontality; 
leaderlessness  
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“The social media team comprised people who were doing Twitter, livestream and Facebook. 
Not everybody was working on everything, but everyone had to know what everyone was doing, 
what messages were getting promoted and that if an action was happening someone on Twitter 
had to be there. At some point it was 16 people. I think that was the biggest that it got in terms of 
the number of people who had passwords or access”. The testimony of Joan Donovan, an 
Occupy Wall Street activist based in Los Angeles and one of the initiators of the InterOccupy1 
activist networking project, describes one of the key organisational structures that have emerged 
within current digital protest movements: social media teams.  
 Managing official Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr and livestream accounts of many recent 
movements, these small groups, comprising up to 20 people have played an important - though 
often invisible - role in many recent social movements. They have been responsible for 
managing official movement social media platforms with a public of hundreds of thousands 
users, attending to such tasks as writing, editing and scheduling Facebook status messages, and 
tweets, responding to user interactions, as well as producing accompanying materials, from 
websites, to videos and visuals. In so doing these groups have deeply shaped the communications 
and ultimately the action of many recent protest movements, such as Occupy Wall Street in the 
US, the 15M/Indignados Movement in Spain and UK Uncut in Great Britain analysed in these 
articles, whose physical appearance was preceded by an intense communication barrage on 
social media (AUTHOR, 2012). 
Social media teams constitute an intriguing object of study, because they allow exploring 
the important but largely invisible organisational structures that have emerged within recent 
social movements in their use of social media and lay bare the inconsistencies of dominant 
interpretations of digital movements as being “leaderless”, “non-hierarchical” (Castells, 2012, 
Mason, 2012) or - to use a term that has become popular among activists - “horizontal” (Sitrin, 
2006). In fact the very existence of groups tasked with the management of key communication 
channels, suggests how far from having disappeared or become irrelevant, leadership understood 
as a process of direction of collective action, involving various forms of influence and control 
(Melucci, 1996, Weber, 2002: 221-225), continues to exist alongside the participatory dynamics 
that have come to be considered as the signature of protest movements in a social media age. To 
                                                          
1 InterOccupy is a project that “seek[s] to foster communication between individuals, Working Groups and local  
General Assemblies, across the movement” http://interoccupy.net/ 
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express the covert leadership performed by social media teams, these structures will be role will 
be construed as digital vanguards, political groups that de facto perform a “vanguard-function” 
(Nunes, 2014), of direction of collective action, in a way reminiscent of historical political 
vanguards.   
 Building on my previous research on social media and activism in the 2011 protest wave 
and my argument about the persistence of leadership in digital movements (Gerbaudo, 2012, 
2014), this article explores the internal functioning of social media teams and evaluates the 
strengths and weaknesses of the leadership role they perform. My analysis draws on expert 
interviews with 12 leading digital activists from the forefront of contemporary anti-austerity and 
anti-capitalist protest movements - the Spanish 15M/indignados, Occupy Wall Street and UK 
Uncut - who have been directly involved in the management of official movement social media. 
Analytically, I focus on three key aspects of the working of social media activist teams: a) their 
formation and composition; b) processes of internal organisation; and c) power struggles arising 
around the ownership and control of “power accounts”.  
 The argument of the article focuses on the contradiction between the libertarian values 
predicated by these movements, and their nature as vanguards. Informed by the anti-
authoritarianism of post-1968 movements and by the techno-utopianism of hacker culture, social 
media teams have adhered to principles of openness, horizontality, and leaderlessness. Yet, 
rather than doing away with leadership the adoption of these principles has ended up making 
leadership invisible and social media teams unaccountable leading to a number of organisational 
quandaries. Social media teams have witnessed a tendency to cliquishness, the emergence of new 
forms of power stratification embedded in the hierarchy of content management systems used by 
activists, and the explosion of power struggles for the control of social media accounts. These 
incidents, whose effects have often been very detrimental for the connected movements, call for 
the development of new and more realistic ethical principles that might better regulate the 
operations of social media teams making them more transparent and accountable.  
 
Leadership reloaded 
 
Talking of leadership in relation to digital protest movements is quite a vexing task, not just 
because of the inherent complexity of the notion of leadership, but also due to the degree of 
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suspicion it produces among many in the activist community and in the academia alike. 
Leadership has become akin to a taboo topic, one that is better not talked about due to the 
sensibilities any open discussion of this issue is likely to hurt. Yet, the dominant consensus about 
the “leaderless” character of contemporary movements needs to be urgently confronted, not only 
because – as I will demonstrate in this article – abundant quantitative and qualitative empirical 
evidence disproves it, but also because the libertarian narrative of leaderlessness and 
horizontality is ethically and politically dangerous, since it allows for de facto leaders to remain 
unaccountable (Gerbaudo, 2012: 165-166). 
Leadership alongside connected notions as mobilisation and organisation has constituted 
one of the key concepts in the analysis of social movements. When we talk of leadership, we 
fundamentally refer to the process of direction of collective action (Gramsci, 1971: 125-127, 
Melucci, 1996, Tarrow, 1998, Morris and Staggenborg, 2004) by means of influence and control. 
Leaders are the people who “take the lead”: the “movers and shakers” of collective action 
(Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 178), “actors whose hands and brain rest disproportionately on 
the throttles of social movements” (2004: 191). They are “the agents of mobilization of a 
movement and the promoters of its organisational structure” (Melucci, 1996: 335), or to follow 
another definition, the “organisers” who “use contention to exploit political opportunities, create 
collective identities, bring people together in organisations and mobilise them against more 
powerful opponents” (Tarrow, 1998: 3).  
Despite the prominence of the question of leadership in social movements literature, in 
recent years a number of scholars have argued that this notion is not relevant anymore due to the 
increasing complexity of society and the “spontaneous”, “horizontal”, “rhizomatic” and 
“leaderless” character of contemporary activism (see for example, Mason, 2012, Castells, 2012, 
Bennett and Segerberg, 2012, 2013). Counter to the dominant interpretation of digital protest 
movements as horizontal and leaderless, in this theoretical section I demonstrate the continuing 
relevance of leadership for an understanding of the organisational dynamics of protest 
movements in a social media era, and argue for a conceptualisation of social media teams as 
digital vanguards, political groups that act as organising hubs for social movements through the 
use of digital communication.  
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Beyond the illusion of leaderlessness 
 
The profound suspicion towards the notion of leadership within contemporary movements needs 
to be understood as the reflection of the influence of libertarian values deriving essentially from 
two sources: the anti-authoritarianism of post-68 social movements and the techno-utopianism of 
hacker culture. A central theme in post-1968 movements in the West has been an anti-
authoritarian emphasis on self-organisation and individual self-realisation against the power of 
large-scale organisations of the Fordist era: corporations, trade unions, parties and the state 
apparatuses (Touraine, 1971, Castells, 2004: 18-20). This orientation strongly resonates with 
attitudes emerging from the techno-utopianism of hacker culture that has accompanied the 
development of computing ushering in values of openness, transparency and freedom of 
information (Levy, 1984, Jordan and Taylor, 2004, Turner, 2006).  
The left-libertarianism of social movements and the techno-utopianism of hacker culture 
have exerted a profound influence on the value-system of recent protest movements as seen in 
the popularity gained by three libertarian principles, which, as I will argue, deeply inform the 
ethos of social media teams: openness, horizontality, and leaderlessness.  
Openness criticises the tendency to closure displayed by traditional organisations and 
their forms of communication. It draws inspiration from the open-source movement, in which 
software is made available for use and modification, and from the philosophy of open-publishing 
that guided the development of the alternative information website Indymedia, which well before 
the social web made user-generated content ubiquitous, allowed Internet users to post 
information without editorial filters (Pickard, 2006).  
Horizontality expresses the rejection of hierarchy and a demand of radical equality. The 
term was popularised by Marina Sitrin (2006) in her account of the 2001 Argentina occupation 
movement and its assemblies, but it has become a referent to describe the participatory and 
networked nature of social media conversations (see for example Penney and Dadas, 2013).  
Leaderlessness, a notion that was widely adopted within the 2011 protest wave 
(Gerbaudo, 2012: 132), follows logically from the former principles in expressing a rejection or 
at last suspicion vis-à-vis leaders of all sorts. In their complex these principles provide a sort of 
ethical matrix that informs the behaviour of contemporary digital activists.  
The problem with these libertarian values is that many activists and academics have 
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ended up taking them at face-value, not just as ethical principles but also as valid descriptions of 
the actual practice of contemporary social movements (Mason, 2012, Castells, 2012: 224). This 
leap is not just theoretically uncritical, but also empirically misguided given that – as I stand to 
demonstrate in this section - an abundant body of scholarship has demonstrated the persistence of 
power dynamics and leadership in digital movements. To deconstruct this libertarian discourse, 
which has acquired the status of an orthodoxy in relevant academic debates, we need to question 
the two fallacious claims on which it rests: the idea 1) that the lack of formal organisational 
structures typical of post-1968 “new social movements” and 2) the interactive affordances of 
digital media result in the elimination of leadership in any form.  
The contention that the decline of formal mass membership organisation leads to the 
eradication of leadership, proposed by various scholars (Epstein, 2001, Bennett, 2003, Bennett 
and Segerberg, 2012), reflects the problematic tendency to identify leadership only with 
formalised and bureaucratic organisations (Barker, Johnson, Lavalette, 2001). It is true that 
scholarship on new social movements emerging after 1968 has evidenced their network-like and 
flexible character (see for example, Melucci, 1996, Diani, 2000, Gerlach, 2001). However, this 
does not mean that leadership has disappeared. In their influential theory of SPIN (segmentary, 
polycentric, networked) movements, for example, L.P. Gerlach and V.H. Hines (1970, Gerlach, 
2001) argued for example that new social movements reflected the presence of “many leaders 
and centers of leadership” (Gerlach, 2001: 294). Reflecting the increasing complexity of post-
industrial society leadership has become more diffuse and interactive as proposed by the concept 
of “distributed leadership” (Brown and Hosking, 1986).  
The idea that the Internet constiutes a radically egalitarian democratic arena allowing for 
egalitarian participation, which in recent years has been been proposed by a number of theorists 
(Shirky, 2008, Van Dijk, 2012), most famously by Manuel Castells in his theory of the network 
society (1997, 2004), also rests on dubious empirical grounds. Analysing the mathematical 
properties of the Internet Physicist Albert-Laszlo Barabasi famously argued that it approximated 
the model of a “scale-free network” (Barabasi and Albert 1999, Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003). 
Scale-free networks follow power laws also known Pareto distributions i.e. conditions in which 
certain nodes acting as “hubs” have a much greater number of links than other nodes and possess 
a tendency to progressively attract more links than smaller nodes. Thus the contention that the 
Internet would facilitate an erosion of leadership processes due to its de-centralised and radically 
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distributed communication architecture are fundamentally spurious. The spatially distributed 
architecture of online communication has in fact been accompanied by centralising forms of 
functional integration and power concentration most glaring manifested in the rise of digital 
titans as Google and Facebook (McChesney, 2013).  
The persistence of forms of power concentration and leadership dynamics both within 
social movements and online communication has a strong bearing on what happens at the 
intersection between these two fields: in the use of social media in connection with protest 
campaigns. In their analysis of tweets of the 2011 Egyptian revolution Christopher Wilson and 
Alexandra Dunn noticed that the great majority was produced by 200 “power” accounts (2011: 
1265), a tiny fraction of those involved in social media activity. A similar situation was 
evidenced when looking at the Indignados’ communication on Twitter in a study conducted by  
researchers of the University of Zaragoza in Spain (González-Bailón et al., 2011: 8), and in a 
longitudinal study of Occupy Wall Street Twitter communication (Wang et al., 2012). Both 
studies retrieved strong power laws at work. In conclusion, much of the scholarship about social 
media and activism appears to have wrongly interpreted as a disappearance of leadership what is 
in fact a reorientation of leadership and its adaptation to the complex and fragmented landscape 
of post-Fordist societies.  
 
Conceptualising digital vanguards 
 
For the purpose of this article I wish to concentrate on the phenomena that possibly best 
exemplify the persistence of leadership dynamics within digital movements: the official social 
media channels of protest movements and the teams tasked with their management. These 
Facebook and Twitter accounts have often been described as “power accounts”, because they 
have accrued a user base of hundreds of thousands of fans on Facebook and Twitter, making 
them the most popular activist accounts in relevant political conversations. Furthermore, as I 
have demonstrated in my previous work, their influence on collective action has been profound, 
given the way in which they have launched protest campaigns, attracted the attention of hundreds 
of thousands of web user and acted as a key channel to launch calls to action (Gerbaudo, 2012).  
 Official social media channels have played an important role in the three movements 
considered in this article: the Spanish 15M movement, Occupy Wall Street and UK Uncut. The 
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Spanish 15M movement owes its name from the initial day of protest on May 15th when 
thousands of Spaniards took to the streets against the economic crisis and political corruption. 
The movement soon developed in a series of occupation, assemblies and marches that attracted 
the sympathy of large sections of the Spanish public. In the 15M/indignados movement, official 
social media accounts included the Facebook page of Democracia Real Ya2, the protest 
organisation that originally called for the 15th of May 2011 protests, counting around 546,000 
likes on its fan page, and 233,000 followers on its Twitter account. The Occupy Wall Street 
movement developed in response to the economic crisis and in criticism of the financial sector. It 
began on September 17th with a protest camp erected in Zuccotti Park at short distance from the 
New York Stock Exchange and in manifold copycat occupations all over the country and abroad. 
In the US the most visible accounts of the Occupy movement included the Twitter accounts 
@OccupyWallStreetNYC3 with 171,000 followers and @OccupyWallStreet4 with 199,000 
followers, and the Facebook pages Occupy Wall St5 with 551,000 likes, and Occupy Together6 
with 252,000 likes. UK Uncut is a protest movement against austerity and tax avoidance that 
emerged in Great Britain in October 2010 and used direct action to close a number of high street 
stores accused of practicing tax avoidance at the public expenses.  UK Uncut’s social media 
asserts included an official Facebook page7 with 103,368 likes and a Twitter account8 with 
81,800 followers.  
To make sense of the working of the social media teams responsible for the management 
of activist power accounts I utilise the notion of “digital vanguard”. This term serves to express 
the fact that the relatively small groupings responsible for the management of official social 
media accounts, have performed what Rodrigo Nunes has called a “vanguard-function” (2014) of 
direction of collective action by means of digital communication, by writing tweets and status 
messages, responding to users etc. and in so doing producing strategic communication 
campaigns.  
The theory of vanguards traditionally originates from What is to be done? (1905) where 
                                                          
2 https://www.facebook.com/AsociacionDRY 
3 https://twitter.com/OccupyWallStNYC 
4 https://twitter.com/OccupyWallSt 
5   https://www.facebook.com/OccupyWallSt. There is an alternate page named 
https://www.facebook.com/OccupyWallSt1 with over 663,000 likes 
6 https://www.facebook.com/OccupyTogether 
7 https://www.facebook.com/ukuncut 
8 https://twitter.com/UKuncut 
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Vladimir Lenin saw the vanguard party as the pivot of a successful revolutionary strategy. The 
vanguard party was conceived as a tightly bound organization capable of instigating 
revolutionary mass mobilization by means of propaganda and agitation. Antonio Gramsci 
described it as a sort of “modern prince”, a collective leadership structure, assuming the role that 
in the past was performed by individual leaders (1971: 129-130). Due to its association with 
Leninism, the notion of vanguards has for long been seen as synonymous with authoritarianism 
and paternalism (see for example Graeber, 2004). However, vanguards have by no means been 
limited to Leninist politics alone. Elements of vanguardism have also inflected the organizational 
theory of anarchism and many anti-authoritarian protest movements inspired by anarchist 
principles. For example Mikhail Bakunin’s proposal for an International Brotherhood, a 
clandestine network of veteran activists who would direct mass revolutionary action (Guerin, 
1970: 153), was fundamentally vanguardist in character.  
In more recent decades, the rise of the New Left and of new social movements in the 70s 
and 80s, has been accompanied by the emergence of organisational structures such as collectives 
and affinity groups (Epstein, 1991), which, despite their anti-authoritarianism, can also be 
interpreted as movement vanguards of sorts, due to the way in which they have acquired the role 
of organising hubs “leading the way” for the entire movement. In her essay on the “tyranny of 
structurelessness” for example, Jo Freeman noticed how the rejection of formal organisation in 
the feminist movement, was accompanied by the emergence of activist elites, small groups of 
activists and friends that thanks to their expertise and social capital, ended up playing an 
influential but largely invisible role in the direction of collective action (1972). Similarly to the 
collectives describes by Barbara Epstein (1991), these groups abhorred being seen as leaders or 
vanguards. Yet, de facto they fulfilled a vanguard-function (Nunes, 2014), by performing the 
strategic task of giving a direction to collective action. This contradiction between libertarian 
criticisms of leadership and the emergence of vanguardist forms of collective leadership is very 
relevant to understand the dynamics of digital movements.  
To complete the theoretical framework of this article it can be said that the notion of 
digital vanguards integrates two key elements that are crucial to understand the specificity of the 
leadership performed by social media teams: its collective and participatory character. First, 
talking of vanguards in this context highlights the predominantly collective rather than individual 
character of leadership processes. This is an important point given the extent to which leadership 
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continues to be associated with individual leaders, such as Martin Luther King in the US civil 
rights movement or Daniel Cohn-Bendit in May ’68, overlooking the prominence of collective 
leadership structures, sometimes named “leadership teams” (Ganz, 2000) in many social 
movements. Secondly, the notion, and in particular the use of the adjective “digital”, aims at 
capturing the historically specific character of the leadership performed by social media teams 
and their reflection of prevalent forms of social experience and social values in the context of a 
digital society. As I will argue, social media teams have attempted with varying results to 
integrate libertarian principles in their activity, by trying to make their groups at least partly open 
to outsiders and avoiding fixed and formalised roles. This feature, which will be unveiled in the 
ensuing empirical section, suggests the need to go beyond view of leadership and participation as 
mutually exclusive processes and to appreciate their mutual imbriciation.  
 
Methods  
 
This article stems from an extensive research project about social media activism, across a 
number of countries invested by the recent wave of popular movements. For the purpose of this 
article I focus on the indignados/15M movement in Spain, Occupy Wall Street, and UK Uncut, 
and on 12 “expert interviews” (Bogner, Littig, Menz, 2009) conducted with key digital activists 
in these movements. Interviewees were selected because of their direct knowledge of the 
operations of key activist accounts. The type of research methods hereby utilised is one that is 
well established in previous research about social movements (see for example Passy and 
Giugni, 2000). Specifically, the tiny size of the sample is justified by a) the expert character of 
the interview and b) by the small dimension of the population of social movement organisers to 
be analysed. Interviewees are identified, except for one case, as indicated in the appendix, by the 
real names, for which the author obtained permission from the interviewees.  
 
Managing “official” activist social media 
 
Social media teams constitute a rather elusive object of investigation. While the presence of 
these teams should be obvious to movement participants, due to the fact that “Facebook and 
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Twitter do not post by themselves” as ironically put by Steve Reid, a key organiser of the anti-
austerity movement UK Uncut, the existence and functioning of these groups has often remained 
a sort of half-secret known only to those deeply involved in the activist community, but mostly 
ignored by fellow travellers9.  
The obscurity in which social media teams have often been shrouded is a consequence of 
the contradiction that constitutes they key finding emerging from this empirical section: the 
presence of a profound tension between digital activists adherence to libertarian principles of 
openness, horizontality and leaderlessness and the persistence of leadership dynamics incarnated 
in the form of digital vanguards. While the secrecy surrounding social media teams also reflected 
other factors, including security considerations, due to the legitimate fear of police infiltration, 
and possible prosecutions for those involved in managing protest communications, its main 
reason had to do with the fact that the very existence of these teams was embarrassing for 
activists, since it blatantly contradicted the official narrative of leaderlessness and horizontality. 
Why would there be communication centres and dedicated teams, if the movement were truly 
horizontal as often proclaimed?  
 In the course of the empirical section I will approach this paradox, in the terms of what 
Theodor Adorno called an immanent contradiction (Adorno, 2010), i.e. a contradiction between 
the principles that are supposed to regulate practice, and the actual practice itself. This critical 
examination requires delving into what we could call the “back office” or “backstage” (Goffman, 
1959) of activist social media, the largely hidden organisational practices and forms of political 
labour involved in the management of official social media accounts, focusing on three aspects: 
a) the composition of social media teams; b) their internal coordination; and c) the power 
struggles that arose within them.  
Each of these levels of analysis manifests a specific contradiction between the high-
minded libertarian values adopted by contemporary movements and their often far more prosaic 
practice. First, while social media teams operated with a notion of radical openness, they have in 
reality been marked by forms of closure due to the desire of veteran activists to maintain some 
degree of editorial and political control. Second, while social media teams subscribed to the 
notion of horizontality, they have been characterised by forms of internal power stratification 
                                                          
9 This might explain why social media teams have never mentioned in the existing scholarly literature, also 
as a consequence of the fact that few scholars in the field have conducted on-the-ground fieldwork and 
spoken with activists, contenting themselves with quantitative data analysis alone. 
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reflected in the positioning of participants in the hierarchy of rights and permissions of the 
management platforms of social media accounts. Finally, while social media teams have 
subscribed to the idea of leaderlessness and to an anti-authoritarian critique of power, they have 
been torn by bitter disputes over the control of accounts.  
 
The formation and composition of social media teams  
 
Across the three movements analysed social media teams were characterised by a number of 
important differences. Most notably some of them acted as working groups emanating from the 
local general assemblies, as it was the case with Occupy Wall Street in New York and Los 
Angeles, and others constituting ad-hoc groupings within a certain protest organisation, as is the 
case with Democracia Real Ya and UK Uncut. Despite this variation they displayed important 
commonalities in their size, composition and the tasks they performed. Based on the interviews I 
have conducted the size of these teams varied between a minimum of just 2 people to a 
maximum of 2010, a size typical of movement vanguards seen in the context of direct action 
movements of the 70s and 80s (Epstein, 1991). The majority of media team members were in 
their early 20s and late 30s, were experienced in IT, and were predominantly male, though 
female representation appeared to be significantly higher than in hacker groups as Anonymous 
and Lulzsec (Coleman, 2014). 
The setting up of dedicated social media teams was motivated by the great amount of 
work required to successfully run a social media communication campaign, and the fact that 
social media constituted the main communication channel for the movements analysed. Counter 
to the caricature of digital activism as “slacktivism” (Morozov, 2009), the work of content 
production and management on social media accounts was so intense that it could hardly be 
executed by one individual, but required the cooperation of a committed team of activists. The 
heavy workload was due to the fact that - as described by Joan Donovan - successful accounts 
needed to deliver both “quantity” and “quality”. Not only did effective social media campaigning 
require a significant volume of status messages and tweets, with peaks of over a message per 
                                                          
10 During the interviews 10 people were given as responsible for managing the Facebook and 
Twitter channel of Democracia Real Ya, in Spain, 20 people were responsible for managing the 
@OccupyWallStreetNYC Twitter account in the US at the peak of the movement, and equally a minimum of 10 to a 
maximum of 20 people were responsible for social media communications of the UK Uncut group. 
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hour during periods of high activity. Content also needed to be carefully thought out and 
verified, given that as Donovan highlights spreading rumours and inaccurate information of the 
type especially likely to arise during intense phases of protest action, would significantly dent the 
credibility of activist social media. Finally, operating official social media channels, required a 
highly diverse range of skills to perform various tasks involved including producing text, dealing 
with security issues, preparing visual material, scheduling messages and responding to users, 
thus making it practically impossible for only one individual to successfully run an activist 
account.  
Social media teams usually started small with the initial core often constituted by close-
knit groups of activists and friends and progressively expanded to encompass more people. 
“Initially it was three of us working on the Facebook page of Occupy. It was me and two friends 
who I really trusted. And once the movement took off, we started adding more people to the 
group” - explains Isham Christie, an Occupy Wall Street activist and one of the founders of the 
main OWS Facebook fanpage. “We tried to incorporate people from what we thought were our 
multiple audiences in the movement, and incorporate people from the different issue areas that 
we thought were important. We had people coming from the housing perspective, from 
thestudent debt perspective, and from other issues areas we considered important”. Similar was 
the trajectory of the communication team of Democracia Real Ya absorbed people from various 
cities across Spain involved in the movement, to ensure better representation of its local support 
base, as described by Klaudia Álvarez, a key member of the team.  
This inclusivity reflected a genuine attempt to implement the value of openness 
predicated by social media teams. However, there are always practical limits to openness and 
inclusivity, and social media teams were no exception, with a tendency to cliquishness often 
tending to arise. Steve Reid a member of the anti-austerity campaigning group UK Uncut for 
example recounts how the core group of the organisation that was responsible for maintaining 
the social media assets was mostly composed of friends who had known each other at the 
Climate Camp protests in the late 2000s, and many of whom lived together, making it quite 
difficult to open to outsiders. Furthermore, as asserted by Shawn Carrié, an activist part of the 
team responsible for managing one of the main Occupy Wall Street Twitter accounts 
@OccupyWallStreetNYC, veteran activists frequently tried to set some control on new people 
wanting to be involved in the team, because if the group had been left unconditionally open “it 
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would have been a complete chaos”. This understandable element of caution however often 
became an excuse for excluding outsiders as lamented by Joan Donovan  
[T]eams became very rigid. It was very difficult to pass in and out of these social media groups. It was kind 
of strange too, because everyone was complaining that there was too much work, but on the other hand 
there was not enough trust to spread that work to other people. 
In conclusion, a number of concerns, including fears about possible infiltrators or opportunists, 
as well as the desire of maintaining some control over content production by more veteran 
activists practically ran against the commitment to radical openness.  
 
The internal coordination of social media teams  
 
A similar contradiction between principle and practice impinged the internal coordination of 
social media teams. These groups ostensibly adopted “horizontal” forms of internal coordination, 
based on an assertion of radical equality, and the rejection of fixed roles and job descriptions of 
bureaucratic organisations as parties and trade unions (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Liam a member 
of the UK Uncut core activist team asserts that the main aim of social media use was to ensure 
horizontal communication within the movement. Similarly, Fabio Gándara, one the founders of 
Democracia Real Ya, argues that within DRY horizontal principles were applied, and that “you 
could not talk about one or another person being leaders of the whole movement”. Despite these 
assertions of horizontality, the actual practice of these groups ended up being characterised 
internally by evident forms of power stratification, with different participants possessing 
different degree of influence over the editorial process. As we will see this tendency was most 
glaringly reflected in the positioning of activists in the hierarchy of rights and permissions of the 
content management system used to coordinate collective work.   
 The adherence to the principle of horizontality was enforced through the adoption of 
consensus-based decision making procedures, similar to the ones used in the popular assemblies 
that have become a signature of many contemporary movements, informed by the principle that 
whenever possible all participants should agree on group decisions. Collective consensus was 
negotiated through a series of meetings and discussions, conducted both online, through such a 
number of services such as Mumble chat sessions, Skype conference calls, Facebook groups, or 
alternative social network sites as Lorea, as well as through face-to-face meetings. In certain 
occasions members of the team were expected to abide by explicit guidelines. Democracia Real 
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Ya for example had a 8-point text, defining the group’s identity and mission as well as a style 
guide that among other things asked contributors to social media accounts not to respond to 
trolls, to stop flames from escalating, and indicated a maximum of 1 message per hour, to avoid 
overloading the timeline of internet users. As Javier Toret, a prominent activist of Democracia 
Real Ya explains the team “worked in accordance with the general coordination [of DRY] and 
they had sufficient autonomy to work within the agreements and the 'style' DRY had 
established”. Elsewhere, as in the case of the main Occupy Facebook page, coordination was 
more loose, the main concern being not to “throw in random topics”, as described by Isham 
Christie. 
 The adoption of the philosophy of consensus decision-making did not however generate a 
truly “horizontal” situation, in which all participants possessed the same say in the management 
of social media accounts. In fact, counter to the image of horizontality, forms of internal power 
stratification affected all the social media teams discussed in this article, with different 
individuals commanding varying degrees of influence on the content channelled by social media. 
The presence of informal hierarchies was manifested in the fact that despite proclaims of 
horizontality at different points the activists who were doing more work took on the role of 
coordinators to ensure organisational structure. In the case of DRY as Klaudia Álvarez puts it 
“the people who worked the most ended up taking more responsibility in collective work”. 
Furthermore, forms of hierarchy were inscribed in the content management systems as Hootsuite, 
Co-tweet or Buffer often used by social media teams11. While some members were only allowed 
to produce new content, others were also entitled to edit and approve other people’s content and 
others still managed user access to the accounts.  
 The correspondence between organisational and technical hierarchies is well captured in 
the testimony of Shawn Carrié, relating the internal functioning of the team managing 
@OccupyWallStNYC 
There is maybe 20 people who have access, and maybe 8 of those people who can approve… What it is, is 
a system of privileges and permissions. Everybody has access to the account but it has a little bit of 
structure where anybody can write tweets, but then they get put into a list which needs to be approved and 
                                                          
11 While at the inception of these movements, some teams simply operated by giving everybody in the group the 
login details to access Facebook and Twitter pages, in most cases they shifted to using these social media 
management system to streamline work. This was an efficiency-oriented move aimed at streamlining content 
production and management. However, this shift also entailed the creation of a hierarchy of control over the content 
produced. 
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the whole group looks at it, and it is happening all the time 24/7. It is a running list. We use a programme to 
streamline it. Somebody submits something he/she wants tweeted and all the group has the possibility to 
look at it, and they can edit it. 
As this testimony demonstrates, the everyday practice of social media teams raised a number of 
practical concerns that could hardly be reconciled with the principle of horizontality and led 
activists to accept the presence of forms of hierarchy. It is true that the taking of leading roles 
within teams tended to follow meritocratic criteria, similar to the ones seen in many hacker 
groups. However, the very existence of such leading roles, coupled with the lack of alertness 
about their existence and of concrete practices to restrain them prepared the terrain for 
misunderstandings and recriminations that in certain circumstances escalated into excruciating 
power struggles, with detrimental results for social media teams and the movements they served.  
 
Struggles for the control of accounts  
 
The persistence of power and leadership dynamics within social media teams, and their nature as 
digital vanguards competing for power, has nowhere been more painfully on display that in the 
struggles around the control of social media assets witnessed in many recent social movements. 
In a number of occasions disputes about the management of activist power accounts have seen 
competing factions fighting to secure control over these assets, with activists engaging in the 
banning of rivals, and in mutual accusations of “hi-jacking” collective resources. There appears 
to be virtually no recent digital movement that has not incurred in one of these incidents. These 
disputes have often been very demoralising for the social movements involved, and have 
contributed to hasten their decline.  
 In the case of Democracia Real Ya, a split opened between two different fronts holding 
different political views about the future of DRY, on the eve of the first anniversary of the 
movement in Spring 2012. One group nicknamed “Refundacion” (re-foundation) wanted to turn 
Democracia Real Ya into a legally registered association. The other group named “Reinicia” (re-
start) or “Dry Red” (Dry Network) opposed the process of formalisation of DRY and wanted the 
group to remain an informal structure or “network”. After a series of verbal confrontations 
between members of the two groups that took place both offline in the context of movement 
assemblies and online through chat sessions on Mumble and other platforms, the rift became so 
vociferous that the two factions ended up partitioning the social media assets of Democracia Real 
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Ya. The “Refundación” group got hold of the Facebook page, and the “Red” group retaliated by 
securing control over the Twitter account. Mutual accusations of having hi-jacked collective 
assets ensued. The rift resulted in a severe reputational damage for Democracia Real Ya, which 
from that day lost much of its credibility with its messages being ignored by its subscribers as 
asserted by many of my interviewees from DRY.    
 In the case of Occupy Wall Street conflicts over the control of key social media accounts 
had already surfaced at the height of the mobilisation in the Autumn and Winter of 2011, leading 
to repeated frictions among the members of social media teams. The most evident manifestations 
of these struggles however became more apparent well after the peak of mobilisation, in 2014, 
when various groups and individuals tried to assert control over the highly valuable social media 
assets left behind by Occupy. In February 2014 activist Justine Tunney who had been involved in 
the early stage of Occupy, and who had been personally responsible for registering various 
activist social media accounts reasserted control on the main Twitter account @occupywallst she 
had created back in 2011, by tweeting “This Twitter handle is now back under the management 
of its founder: @JustineTunney. Let’s start a revolution”. Tunney a self-defined “champagne 
tranarchist” and a Google engineer acted out of frustration for the direction taken by Occupy 
Wall Street, and the way she had felt treated by other activists. A sort of “public breakdown” – as 
described by fellow activist Micah White, the person credited with inventing the name “Occupy 
Wall Street” – ensued with Tunney writing a series of bizarre messages, including one in which 
she proposed to create a non-violent militia. On August 8th of the same year, Justin Wedes, 
another high profile Occupy Wall Street activist based in Detroit, after a longstanding argument 
with people on the “Tweet boat” social media team asserted control over another key social 
media asset of the movement, the account @occupywallstreetNYC, before suspending the 
account.     
  Struggles for the control of key activist accounts should not be seen as trivial and 
inconsequential incidents, that is, “petty squabbles”. These incidents have had tangible 
consequences for the movements affected. First, they contributed in creating deep rifts among 
core activists dividing forces. In the US, the struggle around the control of the 
@occupywallstreetNYC account even escalated in a legal case, opposing a group of OWS 
activists to Detroit-based activist Justin Wedes accused of “hijacking” the Twitter account12. 
                                                          
12 http://globalrevolution.tv/vida/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Service-Dummy.pdf 
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Second, these struggles contributed in delegitimising the most important public voices of these 
movements, thus nullifying the intense political labour expended by many activists. Thus, for 
example in Spain, the confrontation within DRY ended up delegitimising in the eyes of the 
movement, the group and its assets, resulting in the practical loss of the highly visible 
communication channels connected with the groups, which could have been very useful in the 
years after the first appearance of the indignados. Similarly in the US, the hi-jacking of Twitter 
accounts deeply demoralising, with the Justine Tunney’s episode being described as a “debacle” 
for the movement even by her own friends13.  
 The responsibility for these disputes should not be retrieved simply in the unethical 
behaviour of opportunistic individuals. It should instead be seen as the reflection of a more 
systemic problem: the inability of high-minded libertarian values to balance the desire from 
groups and individuals to assert control over accounts, which possess an evident value (one also 
quantifiable in economic terms) due to their reach of a user base of hundreds of thousands of 
followers and fans, and the possibility of influencing political debates. Tim Fitzgerald, an 
Occupy activist who became well-known within the movement because of his “live minuting” of 
general assemblies, argues that these struggles reflect the “capitalist property mentality” intrinsic 
in social media and its “politics of name and password” which he sees as reflecting “the same 
mechanism of lock and key” of physical property. According to him it is necessary for activist to 
move towards a “collective credentials system” in which collectives rather than individuals 
would be assigned ownership of accounts, thus making the hi-jacking of social media assets 
more difficult and forcing team members to find a consensus on all important decisions. 
Proposals as the one by Fitzgerald are testament to the increasing awareness about the continuing 
existence of power and leadership dynamics within digital movements and the need to establish 
new forms of democratic control over them to avoid the highly divisive struggles that have 
resulted from the lack of clear management rules.  
 
 
 
Scrutinising the power of digital vanguards 
 
                                                          
13 http://occupywallstreet.net/story/justine-tunney-debacle-occupywallstorg 
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Exploring the internal functioning of social media teams responsible for the management of 
power accounts of recent protest movements this article has interpreted them as digital 
vanguards, collective leadership structures whose very existence runs in contradiction with the 
libertarian values of openness, horizontality and leaderlessness that permeate activist discourse.  
 The theorising of social media teams as vanguards has mainly served to emphasise the 
collective rather than individual character of emerging leadership structures. This is an aspect 
that is at loggerheads with prevalent understandings of leadership that tend to identify leadership 
with its most personalistic manifestations (Barker, Johnson, Lavalette, 2001), overlooking the 
importance played by collective forms of leadership. Within the 2011 wave of protest there have 
in fact also been manifestations of individual forms of leadership, as exemplified in the role 
played by “micro-celebrity activists” (Tufekci, 2013), individuals with large followings on 
Twitter and Facebook, sometimes acquiring a central position in political conversations. Yet, it 
can be argued that digital vanguards had a more important role than micro-celebrities, due to 
their responsibility for managing the most important voices of social movements. The 
importance gained by digital vanguards is thus a reminder of the fact that beside their 
individualising tendency described by new media psychologist as Sherry Turkle (2012), social 
media have also afforded new possibilities for cooperation (Weiss, 2005, Bonabeau, 2009).  
 Talking of social media teams as digital vanguards however requires some important 
caveats due to the negative connotations of authoritarian and paternalism connected with this 
term and the historical specificity of social media teams and the reflection of the values of a post-
industrial and digital age. Compared with historical vanguards, social media teams have been 
characterised by a far more libertarian attitude, attempting to integrate values of openness, 
horizontality and leaderlessness and the participatory culture of the Internet (Jenkins, 2006) in 
their operations, with varying degrees of success. This has been seen in the way in which they 
have tried to be inclusive towards outsiders and have adopted informal modalities of 
coordination rejecting fixed roles and responsibilities. While there are no doubt some positive 
elements in this attempt to “open up” vanguards, the frequently uncritical adherence to 
libertarian values drawn from the hacker culture and post-1968 protest movements has generated 
some major frictions with the strategic requirements of leadership, and connected concerns about 
security, reliability and control of protest communications.  
 Social media teams have proven very competent at the phase of inception of their parent 
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movements, demonstrating the power of flexible and informal organising supported by digital 
communication technologies. This has been testified in the last instance by the fact that they have 
rapidly attained a vast user base, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, thus locating these 
accounts among the most popular social media channels for political discussion in their 
respective countries and by the important role these channels have played in mobilising people 
for offline actions, an aspect I have discussed in my previous work (Gerbaudo, 2012). These 
outcomes are particularly impressive when taking into account the volunteer character of 
political labour involved, and the informal character of their internal coordination. 
Despite these strengths, in the long term social media teams have experienced serious 
issues, resulting from a mismatch between high-minded libertarian principles - absolute 
openness, leaderlessness and horizontality - and a reality marked by the persistence of power 
dynamics, and of typical scourges of movement politics such as factionalism and opportunism. 
Claims to radical openness have often been contradicted by a tendency towards secretiveness and 
exclusion of newcomers. Assertions of leaderlessness have butted heads with the very presence 
of social media activist teams and their de facto role as organising hubs. Adherence to principles 
of horizontality has been contradicted by forms of internal power stratification reflected in the 
hierarchy of user rights and permissions of content management platforms. These problems can 
be understood as a consequence of the difficulty in maintaining consensual decision-making 
procedures when groups grow beyond a certain size (Gastil, 1993). At their inception the 
relatively small group size allowed activists to organise quite effectively in an informal manner. 
Yet, with the passing of time, the growth in workload, group size and internal diversity in terms 
of backgrounds and political positions posed serious challenges to the maintenance of cohesion 
and coordination, leading different factions and individuals to compete for control.  
The issues experienced by social media teams beg the question of possible solutions.For 
some scholars as David Kreiss and Zeynep Tufekci, the problem lies in the very informal 
character of these movements, and their advice is thus that these movements should adopt 
formalised organisational structures (2013), as those of parties and NGOs. This line of criticism 
seems however to ignore the long history of social movements as informal organisations (Diani, 
2000), precisely because of their criticism of formalised organisations and their bureaucratic 
tendencies, and to overlook the problems inherent in processes of formalisation and 
professionalisation. I contend that what is required instead is the establishment of informal rules 
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of behaviour that could make the operations of social media teams more transparent and 
accountable to the movements they serve, as in the proposal of a collective credentials system 
advanced by Tim Fitzgerald.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The analysis of social media teams proposed in the article demonstrates that leadership – a 
process seen in different shapes in virtually all social movements (Barker, Johnson and 
Lavalette, 2001) - has not miraculously disappeared in a digital era, as often claimed by scholars. 
Rather - as demonstrated by the doings of social media teams, and their role as digital vanguards 
within many contemporary movements - leadership is being recast in new forms that make use of 
the affordances of social media. This trend leads to a contradiction between the libertarian 
principles of openness, horizontality, and leaderlessness, adhered to by digital activists and the 
strategic needs of giving a coherent direction of collective action and maintaining forms of 
control over the content that is produced on social media accounts. While social media teams 
have managed to navigate this contradiction reasonably well at their inception, in the long term it 
has produced serious frictions. 
The findings and theorising of this article have important implications for scholars and 
activists. Scholars are urged to scrutinise the ideological subtext of terms as horizontality and 
leaderlessness, that have become sort of unquestioned dogmas in the analysis of contemporary 
digital activism, and to reopen the debate on leadership and its meaning in a digital society. 
Future research will need to further excavate the novelty of the interactive and participatory 
kinds of leadership seen in contemporary digital activism and flesh out in more detail the nature 
of the interaction between digital leaders and the crowd of ordinary Internet users. Activists 
instead are advised to establish new mechanisms of democratic control over digital vanguards 
and their social media assets, to make the forms of power associated with them more 
accountable. Since the libertarian hope that leadership would evaporate as a consequence of the 
diffusion of network technologies has proven ill-founded, the challenge we face is to develop a 
conceptual framework to understand the manifestations of leadership in a digital era and to 
devise concrete political practices to restrain and regulate them.  
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Appendix 
 
This article is based on 12 in-depth interviews with activists who participated in Occupy Wall 
Street in the US, Democracia Real Ya in Spain, and UK Uncut in Great Britain. Interviewees 
were selected among the most prominent digital activists in each of the movements considered in 
this investigation. Interviews lasted for around an hour, discussing the internal operations of 
digital activism and their problems.  
 
 Name  Country Group 
1 
 
Marta Franco Acampada Sol Spain 
2 Klaudia Álvarez  
 
Democracia Real Ya Spain 
3 Pablo Gallego Democracia Real Ya Spain  
 
4 Fabio Gándara Pumar Democracia Real Ya Spain  
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5 Javier Toret Democracia Real Ya Spain  
 
6 Shawn Carrié Occupy Wall Street US  
 
7 Joan Donovan Occupy Wall Street 
 
US 
8 Tim Fitzgerald Occupy Wall Street 
 
US  
 
9 Isham Christie Occupy Wall Street US  
 
10 Micah White Occupy Wall Street US  
 
11 Steve Reid UK Uncut UK 
 
12 
 
Liam (anonymised) Uk Uncut UK 
 
 
 
